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Case No. 20150623-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

CARL HOLM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Defendant appeals from a conviction for Negligent Homicide, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not allowing individual
questioning of potential jurors who demonstrated no indication of bias after
it asked specific questions requested by defense counsel as to their personal
experience with serious car wrecks?

Standard of Review. Review is for abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Utah
Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, ,I36, 285 P.3d 1208.
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2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting a

nongruesome photograph of the victim at the crime scene when that
photograph was directly probative of an essential element of the crime
charged?

Standard of Review. A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, if 35, 106 P.3d 734.
3.

Did the trial court adequately instruct the jury on the law of

criminal negligence?

Standard of Review.

A h·ial court's refusal to give a purposed jury

instruction is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992).

4.

Did the State produce sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction

for negligent homicide?

Standard of review. In assessing a claiin of insufficiency of the evidence,
the court reviews the evidence and all inferenc~s which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. State v.

1\1aestas, 2012 UT 46, if 302, 299 P.3d 892. This Court does "not re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses or second-guess the jury's conclusion"; it determines
"only whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each
element of the charge, whether sufficient evidence was before the jury to
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enable it to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed
the crime." State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, if 44, 57 P.3d 977 (citation omitted).
5.

Does the cumulative effect of any errors undermine confidence

in the jury verdict?

Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206:

Negligent homicide.
(1)
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent hmnicide if the
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of
another.
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(4):

A person engages in conduct:
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of
his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
·occur.The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it c~nstitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care lha t an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law -3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1

On September 22, 2012, Francisco Garcia was killed when the car he
was riding in as a passenger was struck by the defendant's vehicle. The car
that Mr. Garcia was traveling in was passing through the intersection on a
green light. R395:81-82, 412:98, 434:120, 451:137, 457:143. The defendant ran
a red light as he entered the intersection. Id.
This crash occurred at the intersection of Bangerter Highway and the
201 Freeway overpass. R395:81, 414:100, 448:134, State's Exh.

23-28.

Bangerter Highway is a fast moving highway, with a speed limit of 50 miles
per hour. R532:218. The State's accident reconstructionist testified that roads
with greater speeds create a greater i1npact and thus carry a greater risk of
fatalities with crashes. R542:228.
The first call for the crash was made to dispatch at 6:08 a.m. R482:168.
M~ndy Grange, the person who made the 911 call, testified that she placed
the call within seconds of the collision. R416:102-103, 436:122. That morning,
the defendant was heading to work for a shift that started at 6:00 a.m.
R653:77. The defendant was expected to be prompt for his shift, and even one

minute after 6:00 a.m. was considered late. R596:20.

1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
See State v. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, ,r 3 n.3, 262 P.3d 1212.

-4-
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Prior to the crash, witnesses Mike and Brittney Grange testified that
they noticed the defendant driving on Bangerter Highway. They testified
they first noticed the defendant because he was weaving in and out' of lanes.
R409:95. This weaving continued several times over several miles as the
defendant traveled northbound on Bangerter Highway.

R409:95, 412:98,

430:116-117. In addition to weaving in and out of his lanes, the defendant
was traveling at a very high rate of speed. R410:96-98, 432. The defendant's
driving pattern was so concerning that the Grange's decided to call 911 out of
concern for the safety of other people on the road. R410:96.
After deciding to call 911, Mike Grange attempted to get close to the
defendant in an effort to get his license plate number. Mr. Grange at one
point was traveling as fast as 70 mph in an effort to catch up to the defendant.
R411:97. Even at this speed, the defendant maintained a distance, and Mr.
Grange was unable to catch up. Id.
Mr. and Mrs. Grange did eventually catch up to the defendant at
Bangerter Highway and Parkway Blvd. where the defendant was stopped at
a red light. R434:120. After the light changed, the defendant continued this
same pattern of speeding, weaving, and errati~ driving. R434:120. As the
defendant approached the intersection where the crash occurred, both Mr.
and Mrs. Grange testified they could see that the defendant was approaching
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a red light at a high rate of speed. R412:98, 414:100, 434:120-121, State's Exh.
24.

Both watched as the defendant ran the red light.

Brittney Grange

testified that the defendant's brake lights never came on prior to the collision.
R435:121.

Mike Grange watched the defendant's car approach

the

intersection and estimated that he may have been traveling between 70 and
90 mph. R423:109.

Stephanie Dayvell was traveling opposite the defendant, in the same
direction as the victim, Francisco Garcia. R450:136, State's Exh. 25. She was
traveling behind Mr. Garcia's vehicle, so the crash happened directly in her
line of sight. Ms. Dayvell testified that she did not see any headlights on the
defendant's car. R452:138, 457:143. It was dark outside at time of the crash.
R400:86, R418:104, R445:131, R452:138,140,131, R473:l59.

The subsequent investigation of Darren Mower, the accident
reconstructionist assigned to the case, corroborated Ms. Dayvell' s testimony.
As part of his investigation, Det. Mower inspected the defendant's car at the
scene of the crash. R486:172. Upon inspecting the defendant's vehicle, Det.
Mower discovered that the light switch on the defendant's car was in the
park position. Id., State's Exh. 17. In t~e park position, the taillights and side
amber lights were illuminated, but the headlights were not. _R486:172-173.

-6-
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The accident reconstructionist cquld only provide a "best estimate" for
the speed in this case. R497:183. He tried several of the traditional formulas
for determining speed, but could not apply them here. He could not apply
the "conservation of momentum" formula to this case because the crash
happened and different angles can affect accuracy of that formula. R498:184.
He could not apply the "conservation of energy" formula because there were
multiple cars involved in the collision.

R499:185.

He could not pull the

speed from the air bag control module on the defendant's car because this
make did not provide any information that could be downloaded. RS00:186.
With none of these primary methods for determining speed available, he had
to give his "_best estimate" based on prior experience. RS0l:187. In doing so,
he estimated the defendant was traveling at a minimum of 50 mph. 501:187.
The accident reconstructionist also determined that just prior to the
crash, the defendant drifted from the left, inside lane to the right lane of
travel where the crash occurred. R495:181-83, State's Exh. 22.
Testimony of Defendant

At trial the defendant took the stand and relayed to the jury_ his
men1ory of the drive prior to the crash. R623:47-106. The defendant testified
that while this intersection was on his regular work route, he typically
crossed this intersection as a passenger in the car and had only driven

,....,
-/-
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through it two, possibly three, times. R626:50. However, Mr. Holm later
admitted that prior to the crash he had been through the intersection, at least
as a passenger, over 80 times. R672:96-98.
The defendant testified that as he drove along Bangerter prior to the
crash, all of the intersections he passed (aside from the one where the crash
occurred), were typical "T" intersections.

R630:54.

The defendant also

testified that he was not in a rush to get to work, and felt no pressure to get
there at a certain time. R646:70. The defendant also testified that he had his
headlights on. R643:67-68.
The defendant testified that as he approached the intersection of the
201 and Bangerter Highway, he was driving near the posted speed limit.
R632:54, 648:72. He testified that he was not fixing the radio, not drowsy, not
ea ting anything, and was not otherwise distracted as he was driving.
R648:72, 650:74.

The defendant also testified that as he approached the

intersection he was looking at the lights and could see green lights. R635:5963. There were red lights in the intersection, but they were off to one side.
The more obvious and constant lights, were green. R636:60, 62-63. He also
testified that from the lane he was traveling in, there was a pole that
obstructed his view of the red lights. R649:73 The defendant testified that he
thought he had a green light to pass through the intersection. R640:64. The

-8-
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defendant claimed that he even checked for opposing traffic in the
intersection in an effort to figure out what was going on and in the end
concluded that he had a green light and was supposed to go. R639:63, 660:84.
The defendant claimed that he even checked the lights a second time as he
passed through the intersection, this time noticing the red light, but by that
time he simply didn't have enough time to stop. R641:65.
The defendant testified that he was ultimately confused at the lights in
the intersection. R660:84.
Evidence that contradicted defendant's story

In contrast to the defendant's description of the intersection, several
witnesses testified during the trial that they pass through the intersection on
a regular basis and have never been confused by the lights. R401:87, 414:100,
436:122, 458:144. Mike Grange testified that even from where he was at the

time of the crash, which was a great distance behind, he could clearly see that
the defendant was approaching a red light.

R412:98-100, State's Exh. 24.

Brittney Grange also testified that she could clearly see the defendant
approaching a red light and expected him to stop. R434:120-121.
In addition to this independent eyewitness testimony, Detective
Mower created a video recording where he drove the same route on
Bangerter Highway as the defendant. R507:193-198. He drove the route in
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the early morning, with similar lighting and traffic. R507:193. This video
recording was submitted to the jury as State's Exhibit 20. Id. The video also
contains a segment where Detective Mower parked his car in the same lqne
the defendant was traveling and recorded the light sequence of the
intersection. R510:196-198. In addition to Exhibit 20, State's Exhibits 18 and
19, which are still photographs of the lights at the intersection, ,vere

submitted to the jury. R512:198-201.
State's Exhibit 20 shows how clearly visible the red lights are in the
intersection. On cross examination, the defendant admitted that the video
demonstrates that from about 200 feet away from the intersection you could
clearly see the red light. R667:91-92. The defendant admitted you can only
see the red light and that from a few car lengths back you cannot see any
green lights. R665:89, 667:91. The defendant admitted that upon review of
State's Exhibit 20, the first lights you can see in the intersection are two clear,
bright, red lights that are directly in front of you. R667:91. The defendant
also agreed that Exhibit 20 de1nonstrates that there are no obstructions that
would block the lights. R668:92-93. Finally the defendant agreed that Exhibit
20 shows that you would have to look past the clear, bright, red lights in

order to see any green lights in the distance. R667:91, 93.

-10-
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Testimony of EMT
During the trial, the jury also heard testimony from Scott Hall, the fire
EMT who responded to the scene of the crash. Mr. Hall is the EMT seen in
Exhibit 26 attending to the victim. R462:148, 469:155, State's Exh. 26. Mr.
Hall testified that the victim was the first person in the car that they attended
to. R465:151. He testified that the victim was not breathing and had no pulse.

Id. Mr. Hall stated that when tested, the victim showed "Pulseless Electrical
Activity" (P.E.A.) which means that while he had no pulse and was not
breathing, his heart had not flat-lined. R465:151-152. IVIr. Hall also testified
that EMT's on scene followed protocol at that point to attend to other
members of the vehicle before extrie.a ting the victim in an effort to focus
resources and to save the most people they could in a mass casualty
situation. R467:153-155. He also testified that under this protocol the victim
was the last to be exh·icated from the car.

Mr. Hall opened the victim's

airway and continued to monitor his P.E.A. until they were able to remove
.him. R468:154. When they were able to remove the victim from the car,
EMT's performed CPR until minutes later when his heart flat-lined and he
was pronounced dead. R471:157-158.
State's Exhibit 26 corroborates Mr. Hall's testimony.

The P.E.A.

machine is depicted on the victiln' s chest. R470:156. Mr. Hall is in the photo
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securing the airway passage open. R470:156. The door that kept the victim
from being pulled out by paramedics until extrication equipment was
available is also depicted in the photograph. R470:156-157.
An autopsy revealed that Fransico Garcia died of blunt force injuries to
the chest. R591:15.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Point I:

The trial court asked sufficient questions to allow counsel to

evaluate the jurors' potential bias. Specifically, the court asked all questions
requested by Defense counsel pertaining to jurors' experience with serious
car crashes. The court followed up with those specific jurors to determine if
that experience created a potential bias. Any potential juror who indicated a
concern for a potential bias was brought in for individual questioning. This
allowed counsel adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors. Additionally,
any error was harmless.
Point II:

The EMT testified that when he arrived on scene the

victin!'s heart was still showing some electrical activity. Because the victim
was pinned in the car, his removal and CPR was delayed.

Exhibit 26

corroborated the EMT' s testimony that they followed protocol and did
everything they could to save the victim. This evidence was demonstrated
that the work of EMT's was not an intervening cause of the victim's death.

-12-
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Further, the danger of unfair prejudice is low because the photo shows little
to no blood, is not an enlargement, and shows the victim exactly how he
appeared on ~cene.
Point III:

The simple negligence instruction requested by the

defendant is not appropriate for a criminal negligence case. The court gave
the jury detailed instructions of what constitutes criminal negligence as well
as instructions on what falls short of criminal negligence.

Further, the

defendant was not prejudiced because his own testimony contradicted a
t~eory that h~ was guilty of even simple negligence.
Point IV:

There was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for

negligent homicide.

The defendant's erratic driving pattern, speeding,

weaving in and out of lanes, driving without headlights in the dark, and
running a red light at near freeway speeds demonstrate repeated deviations
from the standard of care that created a grave risk of death. When taken
together, the defendant's actions were a gross deviation from the standard of
care an ordinary person would exercise.

When viewed in a light most

favorable to the jury's verdict, there was more than sufficient evidence to
sustain. a conviction.
Point V: There were no errors in the trial that resulted in the defendant

receiying an unfair trial.

-13-
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO QUESTION JURORS
WHO DEMONSTRATED NO INDICATION OF BIAS.

During the voir dire process, the court instructed the potential jurors
that, if selected, they must base their ver<lict solely on the evidence, free fronl
any biases or prejudice. The court instructed the jury that their verdict could
not be based on personal experience, or what has happened in their lives, and
asked if anyone would have a problem following that instruction. R354:40.
To this question no hands were raised.
At the request of defense counsel, the trial court specifically asked the
jury panel if any of them had ever personally been involved in a serious car
accident. R353:39. Some members of the jury raised their hands.

Later,

defense requested that the court broaden the question asked earlier to
include whether anyone close to them had ever been involved in a serious car
accident. R355:41. The trial court granted this request and asked the potential
jurors if anyone close to them had ever been involved in a serious car
accident. R355:41. Several jurors raised their hands. R355:41-42. The court
then asked those who raised their hands:

-14-
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"Is there anything about that experience that makes you feel like you
might be biased for one side or the other?" R356:42.
To this question a few jurors raised their hands. All who indicated
they may be biased were further questioned individually outside the
presence of other members of the jury. R359:45-54. During this time the
court allowed counsel for defendant to ask any follow up questions they
wanted.

The only question defense counsel asked was to juror number 13

when he asked:
"Do you think you could give him a fair trial? And I understand you
would do yo~r best, but are you confident about it?" R363:49.
The juror replied: "I think so." This juror was then excused. With this
answer, the defense did not make a for cause challenge to the juror. R363:49.
A. The totality of the questioning
opportunity to evaluate the jurors.

gave

counsel

ample

Vair dire (1) ferrets out bias that would render a prospective juror
constitutionally incompetent to serve and (2) elicits sufficient information to
allow trial counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. State v.

Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 866-69 (Utah 1998). "The scope and conduct of
voir dire examination is within the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 867.
Trial

" ✓ courts

should be permissive in allowing voir dire questions and
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should exercise their discretion in favor of allowing counsel to elicit
information from prospective jurors."' Id. at 868.
However, the Utah Supreme court has clarified that "trial judges are
· not compelled to permit evenJ question that is 'appropriate' in the sense that
it might disclose some basis for counsel to favor or disfavor seating a

particular juror." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868. Nor is "a defendant entitled
to 'ask questions in a particular manner."' Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ,I70,
156 P.3d 739 (quoting Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867) (citing Mu'Min v. Virginia,

•

6,";._,

500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991)) ("[A]s long as the relevant subject area of potential
bias was covered, the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the failure
to ask questions in a particular manner.").

A "trial court must possess

discretion" in conducting voir dire "because of the multitude of factual
variations that may affect the proper scope of questioning." Piansiaksone, 954
P.2d at 868.
The amount of discretion varies depending on the nature of the
II

question sought to be asked. Id. Vair dire questions which more directly
search for questionable attitudes among jurors deserve more favorable
treahnent by trial courts than those which require multiple inferential steps
or follow-up questions to ~lucidate real or possible bias." Id. Thus, a trial
court's voir dire discretion "is strictly limited where the questions are directly
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related to bias and prejudice, but increases as the directness of that relation
decreases or, in some instances, where the question unduly intrudes upon the
privacy of the jurors." Id.; see also State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,
951.

,r 43, 992 P.2d

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in limiting voir dire if,

"considering the totality of the qu~stioning, counsel was afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors."

Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Miller v.
Utah Dept. ofTransp., 2012 UT 54, ,r,r 36-37, 285 P.3d 1208.
In this case, the cc~mrt asked sufficient q"?estions to allow counsel to
gain information necessary to evaluate the juror's potential bias based on
experience with car wrecks. The court did not limit voir dire to superficial
questions of fairness. Indeed, the court did ask such general questions at
other points during the selection process, but when asked by defense counsel
to probe into more specific areas of potential bias, the court did so.
The court first inquired as to whether anyone had personally been in a
serious car wreck. The word "serious" specified situations where the wreck
was more than a simple fender bender and invited jurors to cohsider
situations similar to that of the case before the court.

Upon request of

counsel, in an effort to illicit more people with potential bias, the court
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broadened the ~quiry to include whether any of them had someone dose to
the1n involved in a serious car wreck.
The court then asked a question that directly addressed potential bias
based on this experience by asking if the experience would cause them to be
biased for one side or the other. This was a not a rehabilitative question
"designed to qualify the jurors as quickly as possible." Saunders, 1999 UT at

1 34.

It was not a general question to everyone in the panel. This question

was directed only at those with a potential bias based on a very specific
personal experience. The judge did not give an instruction and then ask the
jurors if they could follow it.

The judge asked an open ended question of

bias that invited specific jurors to evaluate, in the narrow context of the
relevant issue, whether or not they had a potential bias.
The fact that the judge did not bring jurors with no potential bias in for
individual questioning does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

As

noted, the defendant was not entitled to "ask questions in a particular
manner." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867; see also Miller, 2012 UT 54,

,r,r 36-37

(no abuse of discretion where court substituted its own voir dire question
that probed area of plaintiff's concern). The court asked adequate questions
of this specific issue and conducted further inquiry of tI:iose who
demonstrated a potential bias.
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Each juror who indicated that they may be biased was brought in for
further questioning. During that questioning, the court placed no limit on
the questions defense counsel asked. Counsel for the defense then asked one
question of one of those jurors. The question defense counsel chose to ask
illustrates how well the courts original question covered the issue. Defense
counsel asked, "Do you think you could give him a fair trial?" R363:49. This
question is almost identical to the question asked by the court before the
jurors were brought in for individual questioning.
None of the details listed by defendant would illustrate a potential bias
or a reason a person would be unfit to serve as a juror. Br.Aplt. 23. They
would "require multiple inferential steps or follow-up questions to elucidate
real or possible bias." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868. At best, this information
may have given a basis for counsel to "favor or disfavor seating a particular
juror" but this is not a reason to compel the court to inquire further than it
did in this case. Id.
B.

Any error was harmless.

Even if the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to bring
unbiased jurors in for individual questioning, any error was harmless.
Failing "to ask an appropriate question on voir dire does not always
constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal." Evans ex rel. Evans v.
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Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court will reverse only
if "considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors."

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds
by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994)).
As shown, the totality of the questioning- including the specific
questions regarding jurors experiences with car crashes- afforded defense
counsel an adequate opportunity to evaluate the jurors. Thus, any error in
failing to individually question unbiased witnesses was harmless.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ADMITTING A NONGRUESOME PHOTOGRAPH OF THE
VICTIM AT THE CRIME SCENE.

The State is entitled to the "'legitimate moral force"' of its evidence and
has "'the right to prove its case up to the hilt in whatever manner it" chooses,
"subject only to the rules of evidence and standards of fair play."' State v.

Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). The applicable Utah
Rules of Evidence are 401,402, and 403.
Evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be w~thout the evidence,/f and "the fact is of
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. All relevant
evidence is generally admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. But relevant evidence is
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inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential
for unfair prejudice. Utah R. Evid. 403.
But under. rule 403, evidence is presumed admissible unless the
defendant can show that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
the photos' probative value. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,

,r 44, 52 P.3d 1210;

State v. Dunr1:, 85~ P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). Simple prejudice is not
enough to exclude evidence; after all, "all effective evidence is prejudicial in
the sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is offered." State v .

.Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (citations ar:id quotation omitted).
Rather, the rule is concerned only with unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice is
that which has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis."

Id. (citations and quotation 0111itted).

A "trial court's decision to

admit evidence under rule 403" is reviewed for abuse of discretion and only
overturned if it is "'beyond.the limits of reasonability."' Diversified Holdings,
L:C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ,r 6, 63 P.3d 686 (citation omitted).
A photo is not rendered irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible merely
because the evidence may be described rather than shown.

Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,

,r 38, 106 P.3d 734; State v.

State v.

Decorso, 1999 UT 57,

ii 54,

993 P.2d 837; State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1989)~ As stated, subject
to the Rules of Evidence, the prosecution has "the opportunity of profiting
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from. the 'legitimate moral force' of _its evidence in persuading a jury."
Gulbransen, 2005 UT at ,r 38. (citations and quotation omitted).

In this case, the State was required to prove that the defendant's
.

'

negligence (and the resulting crash) was the proximate cause of the victim's
death. While the victim was pronounced dead at the scene, he was not dead
when emergency personnel arrived. These circumstances raise the issue of
whether the victim could have been saved, and whether the actions of
emergency responders were an intervening cause of the victim's death.
The testimony of EMT Scott Hall was that the victim had not flat-lined
and still had electrical activity in his heart. Despite the P.E.A. the victim
demonstrated, he was not immediately removed from the car to undergo
CPR. Not until later, when EMT's could remove the victim from the vehicle

did they attempt CPR before the victim's heart eventually flat-lined. Mr. Hall
testified that they followed protocol for this type of casualty situation.
State's Exhibit 26 corroborates Mr. Hall's testimony.

The P.E.A.

machine is depicted on the victim's chest. R470:156, State's Exh. 26. Mr. Hall
is in the photo securing the airway passage open. Id. The door that kept the
victim from being pulled out by paramedics until extrication equipment
became available is also depicted in the photograph. R470:156-157. All of this
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corroborating evidence was highly probative of an essential element in this
case: cause of death.
Defense claims that cause of death was not a disputed issue at trial.
Brf.Aplt.29. They argue that their decision to pursue a theory of criminal
negligence, rather than causation, somehow diminishes the probative value
of evidence showing causation. But so long as Mr. Holm maintained his plea
of not guilty, the state was entitled to prove its case "up to the hilt." Florez,
777 P.2d at 455 (citation omitted).

State's Exhibit 26 was visible, tangible

evidence that helped show there was no intervening cau~e that lead to the
death of the victim.
Further, the danger of unfair prejudice is low. None of the victim's life
threatening injuries are depicted in the photograph.

There are no major

wounds or bruising. There is a small amount of blood coming from the
victhn's nose and a small cut on his lip.

The exhibit shows the paramedic

attending to the victim, and the victim appears exactly how he was found at
the crime scene. The photograph is not a disto~ted close up with extraneous
objects that would exacerbate the impact on the viewer. See Bluff, 2002 UT at
151.
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Because the probative value of the photograph was very high and was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court did
not err ~ allowing the photo to be presented to the jury.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE APPLICABLE LAW.

"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to
the facts of the case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). The
defendant has a right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a
clear and understandable way. Id. However, "it is not error to refuse a
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in other instructions."

Id. Even in the context of the defendant's mental state, it is not essential to a
fair trial that specific terms requested by the defendant be used, or that a
separate instruction be given, so long as the explanation of the appropriate
mental state is found sufficient. State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah
1982).

A trial court's refusal to give a purposed jury instruction is a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238.
A. The Simple Negligence Instruction Is Inappropriate For a
Criminal Negligence Case.

The defense subn1itted the Utah Model Jury Instruction (MUJI) for
simple negligence.

Brf.Aplt.Addendum D.
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.

'

committee, this instruction was provided to be used in very limited criminal
cases. There are two types of cases listed by the Committee ..
The· first is Automobile Homicide as a Third Degree Felony pursuant
to U.C.A. § 76-5-207(2). Under this statute, a person is guilty of a third
degree felony if they operate a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing
the death of another and have a blood alcohol of .08 grams or higher; or have
enough alcohol or drugs in their system to render them incapable of safely
operating the vehicle.

Id.

The statute specifies that "as used in this

Subsection (2), 'negligent' means simple negligence, the failure to exercise
that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like
or similar circumstances." Id. In this context, th~ simple negl_igence standard
is an element of the offense, and the statute very specifically calls for this
definition.
The second type of case li~ted by the Committee is De~ling Harmful
Material to a Minor pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-10-1206. Like the automobile
homicide statute,§ 76-10-1206(1) uses the word "negligently", distinguishing
it from other criminal cases where criminal negligence is the required mental
state. In State v. Haltom, as part of the defendant's argument, he conceded
that ordinary negligence was sufficient to violate § 76-10-1206. 2007 UT 22,

if 6, 156 P.3d 792. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. Id.
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Both of these specific situations mentioned by the MUJI Committee are
clear (either by statute or court interpretation) -~hat simple negligence is the
requisite mental state for the crime charged. The Committee warned that
"caution should be exercised to ensure the appropriate mental state
instruction is used in criminal cases 1.phere negligence is asserted." See CR305,
Committee Notes (emphasis added).

The Committee's desire to guard

against the confusion that may arise in the criminal negligence context is
illustrated by the specificity with which they list out the auto homicide
statute. The committee very specifically listed the third degree felony version
of auto homicide found in U.C.A. § 76-5-207(2). U.C.A. § 76-5-207(~) lists out
the e_lements of auto homicide as a second degree felony. The only difference
with§ 76-5-207(3) and§ 76-5-207(2) is the requirement of criminal negligence
in the former verses simple negligence_in the latter.
In the notes, the Committee took pains to emphasize the "very limited
prosecutions" in which this instruction is used. In that note, the Committee
did not broadly mention all of § 76-5-207, which would encompass cases
involving .criminal negligence. The MUJI Committee very specifically listed
.

only§ 76-5-207(2)(c), which is one of the few cases where ordinary negligence
is sufficient to constitute criminal conduct.
B. The Law Regarding Criminal Negligence.
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Under Utah law, a person acts with criminal negligence when. "he
ought. to be aware of a . substantial . and unj,ustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist,. or the re~ult will occur." U.C.A. § 76-2-104(4) (2003).
"The substantial and unjustifiable risk of which a person ought to be aware
of in a negligent homicide is death." State v. Boss, 2005 UT App. 520,

,r

11,

127 P.3d 1236 (internal citation omitted). "The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." U.C.A. §76-2-103(4)
(2003) .
."Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil action for damages,
is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT
App. 106,

if 18, 999 P.2d 1252 (quoting State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989).. Mere inattention or mistake in judgment is not criminal
unless the quality of the act makes it so. Warden, 784 P.2d at 1207. Criminal
negligence must be more than lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must
be something more than mere inadvertence or misadventure. Larsen, 2000 UT
App. at 118 (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law§ 136).
C. Instructions Given By The T.rial Court.
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The trial court provided the jury with several instructions regarding
the concept of criminal negligence.

Instruction No. 24 quoted verbatim

U.C.A. § 76-2-103(4):
A person acts with criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes
a gross deviation for the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.

Instruction No. 36 correctly states this court's finding in Boss that "the
substantial and unjustifiable risk of which a person ought to be aware in a
case of negligent homicide in death." 2005 UT App. at ,r 11; R223.
Instruction No. 27 reiterates the requirement from§ 76-2-103(4) that the
conduct must be a "gross deviation" from the standard of care exercised by
and ordinary person. R214.

Instruction 27 further illustrates for the jury

conduct that falls short of criminal negligence:
"Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a civil_action for damages,
is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." Larsen, 2000 UT
App. at~ 18; R214.
Mere inattention or mistake in judgement resulting even in death of
another is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so.
Warden, 784 P.2d at 1207; R214.
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Criminal negligence must be more than the lack of ordinary care and
precaution; it must be something more than mere inadvertence or
misadventure. Larsen, 2000 UT App. at ,r 18; R214.
The defense claim that they were unable to have their theory clearly
explained by the jury instructions is misplaced.

Brf.Aplt.29. The defense

argues that their theory of the case was that Mr. Holm was acting with
simple negligence and was therefore not guilty. Id. Stated another way, the
defense theory was that Mr. Holm's actions fell short of criminal negligence,
so he was not guilty of negligent homicide.

With a clear, thorough

explanation of the correct law regarding criminal negligence, the jury was
well informed of the difference between criminal negligence and ordinary
negligence, thus allowing the defendant to assert his desired theory.
In making his argument, defendant claims that the trial court error
prevented the jury from "understand[ing] that although Mr. Holm's actions
were a serious mistake in judgment and outside the ordinary standard of care, his
actions did not rise to the level of criminal negligence."

Brf.Aplt.36.

(emphasis added). The defe:i;ise argument simply ignores the fact that the
jury was informed "mistake in judgment" and "lack of ordinary care" do not
rise to the level of crin1inal negligence. See Instruction No. 27. "It is not error
to refuse a proposed insh·uction if the point is properly covered in other
insh·uctions." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238; see also State v. Wilcox, 498 P.2d 357
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(Utah 1972) (where the court found that the concepts discussed in the
defendants instruction were covered in another instruction, and it was
therefore inadvisable to make the instructions m9re complicated by use of
synonyms which add little or nothing to make a term easier to understand).
All of the concepts described in the ~efendants proposed inslTuction were
covered and recovered in Instructions 24, 25, 26, 27 and 36.

D. The Defendant Was Not Prejudiced.
Defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to give the definition of
shnple negligence should undermine this court's confidence in the outcome
of the trial. Brf.Aplt 34-36. However, as stated above, the defense theory in
the case was not isolated to convincing the jury that the defendant was guilty
of simple negligence. In fact, this theory would have been inconsistent with
the defendant's own testimony.
The defendant took the stand and described a careful drive where he
was not drowsy, not distracted by the radio or food, and where he was not
in a rush to get to work. He testified that he was driving around the posted
speed limit, that he did not speed off at the frontage road as he approached
the intersection, and that any swerve his vehicle may have made was the
result of a drink slipping out of the cup holder. He also testified that he had

-30-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

his headlights on while he was driving, which is contrary to eyewitness
testimony and the final position of his headlight switch.
The defendant relayed to the jury a very careful approach to a very
confusing intersection. He described how he saw a green light, that the light
was constant and directly in front of him. He claimed that he was in fact so
careful that he checked traffic in the intersection to insure that he indeed had
a green light to proceed on. He even double checked the light as he passed
through the intersection. He said that the red light was obstructed by a pole
and a blind spot in his car. Ultimately, the defendant said he was confused at
the lights and went through because he thought he was supposed to go.

If the jury believed the defendant's testimony, they would not
conclude he was even guilty of simple negligence. If the jury believed the
defendant's account of what happened, they would believe that he was
acting as a prudent person and that he was exercising reasonable care.
Under the defendant's story, at best he was victiln of being unfamiliar with a
poorly designed intersection, and at worst, he made a simple mistake after
exercising a great degree of care.

If the jury believed the defendant's

testimony, they would have found him not guilty because he was not
criminally negligent, not because he was "simply negligent". However, the
jury clearly did not believe his story.
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The defense theory in this case was that the defendant did not act . with
criminal ·negligence.

The jury received very thorough instructions with

regard to the applicable law in this case. As such, the court did not err in
refusing to give the proposed definition of simple negligence.
IV.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
CONVICTION FOR NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

THE

A. The defendant failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting
the jury's verdict.

Defendant correctly asserts that in State v. Nielsen, our supreme court
"repudiate[d] the default notion of marshaling." 2014 UT 10, ~41, 326 P.3d
645. In Nielsen, the court clarified that a technical deficiency in the
marshalling requirement would not result in a default, thus inhi~iting the
court from proceeding on the merits. Id. at

if 41. This was done in an effort

to get the parties to focus their argument o~ the merits of the case rather than
some deficiency in the appellant's duty of marshalling. Id. at il 42.
However, in Nielsen, the court also made it clear that the appellate still
has a duty to marshal the evidence for a sufficiency clahn. Id. at

iJ 40. The

court stated: "[W]e reiterate that a party challenging ... sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict ~ill almost certainly fail to carry its burden of
persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal." Id. at ,r 42.
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In exa1nining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court
should review the record as a whole. State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App. 9,
366 P.3d 884., see also State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App. 4,

,r 41,

if 44, 803 Utah Adv.

Rep. 35. Thus, the court is not limited to evidence adduced during the state's
case, but may also consider evidence produced during the defense case.
In his brief, the defendant vastly undersold the record evidence
supporting his conviction for Negligent Homicide. In an effort to highlight
how the defense has failed to meet its burden of persuasion, See id. at

,r

41,

and to aid the courts analysis of the merits of the defendants claim, the State
lists the following facts from the record to supplement the defense
presentation of the marshaled evidence:
1. Bangerter Highway is a fast moving highway, with a speed of 50
mph. R532:218. The State's accident reconstructionist testified that
roads with greater speeds carry a greater risk of fatalities with
crashes. R542:227.
2. Mike and Brittney Grange testified that the defendant continued
weaving, several times over several miles. R409:95, 412:98, 430:116117. Mike Grange testified that he tried to catch up to the defendant
and at one point reached a speed of 70 mph. R411:97. Even at this
speed, t~e defendant maintained his distance and Mr. Grange could
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not catch up with him.

R411:97. B~sed on his own speed, Mr.

Grange estimated that the defendant may have been going close to
90 miles per hour. R422:108. The defenda~t' s driving pattern ~as
so concerning to the Grange's that they decided to call 911 out of
concern for the safety of other people on the road. R410:96. The
defendant's pattern of speeding and weaving in and out of his lanes
continued between Parkway Blvd. and the intersection where the
crash occurred. R434:120. Just prior to the crash, the defendant
drifted from the left, inside lane to the right lane of travel w_here the
crash occurred. R495:181-83, State's Exh. 22. Mr. Grange watched
the defendant's car approach the intersection and estimated that he
may have been traveling between 70 and 90 mph. R423:109.
3. The accident reconstructionist could only provide a "best estimate"
for the speed in this case.

R497:183.

He tried several of the

traditional formulas for determining speed, but could not apply
them here. He could not apply the "conservation of momentum"
formula to this case because the crash happened and different
angles that can affect accuracy of that formula. R498:184. He could
not apply the "conservation of energy" formula because there were
multiple cars involved in the collision. R499:185. He could not pull
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the speed from the air bag control module on the defendant's car
because this make did not provide any information that could be
downloaded. RS00:186. With none of these primary methods for
determining speed available, he had to give his "best estimate"
based on prior experience. R501:187. In doing so he estimated the
defendant was traveling at a minimum of 50 mph. 501:187.
4. Every eyewitness who was at the scene of the crash testified that it
was dark outside at the time of the crash.

R400:86, R418:104,

R445:131, R452:138, 140, 141, R473:159.

5. At the time of the crash, Mr. Holm was 8 minutes late for work, and
still had some distance to go before he arrived at his place of
employment. R653:78,R654:79, State's Exh. 28.
6. The defendant passed through this same intersection to and from
work every day for two months prior to the crash. R670:94. When
he wasn't driving, he was sitting in the front passenger seat.
R672:96.

Prior .to the crash, he had been through that same

intersection at least 80 times, possibly more. R672:96-97.
7. Four other witnesses, who pass through this intersection on their
way to work, testified not only that they are not confused by the
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intersections layout or traffic signals, b:ut that they have never been
confused by them. R401:~7, R414:100, R436:122, R458:144.
The defendant's

II

overbroad assertions in his brief regarding the

absence of evidence in the record, and his general failure to identify and deal
with that evidence" should certainly affect and greatly undermine his claim
on appeal. Nielsen, 2014 UT at

,r 44.

Due to this failure, the defendant has

II

failed to establish a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference
owed to ... [the] jury verdict." Id. at ,r 41.
B. There was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.

When the court considers an insufficiency of the evidence claim, the
11

court review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." Id. at
146. (quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,
quotations omitted)).

,r

302, 299 P.3d 892 (internal

The court may reverse a verdict "only when the

evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." Id. "So
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
[the courts] inquiry stops." State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,
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The defendant relies entirely on Larsen to argue that his conduct was
not criminally negligent, but "can be more accurately characterized as a
serious mistake in judgment." 2000 UT App. 106; Brf.Aplt.41. In Larsen, the
defendant made a left turn at normal speed at an intersection and collided
with an oncoming car which would have been visible to the defendant had
he been looking. Id. at ~19.

The court held that while the defendant's

conduct was negligent, it was more accurately characterized as a serious
mistake in judgment. Id. at

~

21. However, in the case before the court, the

defendant's repeated deviations from the standard of care are clearly
distinguishable from the evidence in Larsen.

Larsen dealt with a simple

1niscalculation of a left turn at a red light. Here, a series of the defendant's
actions created a perilous situation that eventually resulted in Mr. Garcia's
de~th. Fortunately, Larsen does not represent the entire analytical framework
of Utah negligent homicide cases.
In Boss, the defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. 2005 UT
App. at ,r,r 2-4. In that case, the defendant was traveling around 70 miles per
hour on a two lane highway. The speed limit on the highway was 65 mph.
Id. Defendant pulled into the opposing lane of travel in an attempt to _pass

two or more cars. Id. When the defendant saw the victim's car approaching
in the opposite direction, the defendant cut sharply back into her lane of
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travel and lost cqntrol of her veJ_-licle, causing it to slide sideways back into
the opposing l~ne of travel. Id. The defendant then collided with the victim's
car causing the death of the rear passenger. Id. On appeal, the defendant
argued that pursuant to State v. Larsen, there was insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for negligent homicide. Id. at il 15. The court disagreed.
The

court

held

that

the

defendant's

distinguishable from the evidence in Larsen. Id. at

actions

il 15.

in

Boss

were

The court found that

the defendant's actions could "be seen as repeated deviations from the
appropriate standard of care, each of which might result in a substantial and
unjustifiable chance of death under the circumstances." Id. at ,r 17. 2
The evidence in this case is similar to the evidence in Boss.

The

defendant was traveling on a fast moving highway, which creates a greater
risk of death in the event of a crash. The defendant blew through a red light
that was clearly visible in an intersection he was very familiar with. He was

2

See also State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991)(upholding a jury
conviction for negligent homicide, finding that in a doctor's treatment of a
premature newborn, there was evidence of repeated deviations from the
standard of care and a wide divergence from the appropriate level of care,
which created a significant risk of death) and State v. Hallett, 619 P.2. 335, 338
(Utah 1980)(upholding a negligent homicide conviction for removing a stop
sign because the defendant should have known that the removal of a stop
sign created special hazards with possible fatal consequences.).
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driving erratically and weaving in and. out of his lanes. The defendant even
drifted from the left lane into the right lane in the middle of the intersection
at the point of impact. Contrary to the defense claim, the defendant's speed
was a contested -issue at trial. There was believable evidence that he may
have been traveling well over the posted speed limit at the time of the crash,
and that evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the jury's verdict.
The defendant's driving pattern was so erratic that independent witnesses
thought they should call the police out of concern for the safety of others on
the road. This pattern continued until the time of the crash.
In Larsen, the court held that there was no causal connection between

,r

22.

However, in Larsen it was still light outside at the time of the crash. Id. at

,r 6.

the absence of headlights and the crash.

Larsen, 2000 UT App. at

Unlike the facts of Larsen, in this case it was dark outside at the time of the
crash. The defendant did not have his headlights on as he traveled down the
highway and into the intersection. None of the witnesses traveling alongside the Honda saw the defendant coming into the intersection. Without
seeing him, no one in that lane, including the driver of the victim's car, could
stop, swerve, or do anything to avoid the collision. They were not looking
for him because he was not supposed to be there .. They did not see him
because he was hidden.
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The risks created by the defendant's violation of multiple traffic rules
ought to have been known.

Boss, 2005 UT App. at

,r

19.

His repeated

deviations from the standard of care, each of which might result in a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, are "indicative of criminal
negligence as opposed to mere inatte,ntion or mistake in judgment."

Id.

When taken together, there was clearly more than sufficient evidence for the
jury to reasonably find that the defendant's failure to perceive the risks
created by his conduct was a gross deviation from the standard of care an
ordinary person would exercise.

U.C.A. § 76-2-103(4).

As such, the

defendant has failed to show that the evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime from which [he]
was co.nvicted." Nielsen, 2014 UT at il 30.
V.

CUMULATIVE
ERROR
DOES
OVERTURNING THE VERDICT.

NOT

JUSTIFY

Defendant asserts that "all of the identified errors" as well as "any
other errors· this Court assumes may have occurred" should undermine this
court's confidence in a fair trial. Aplt. Br. 41. An appellate court reverses on
cumulative error only if errors are so pervasive and prejudicial that they
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"undermine[] [this Court's] confidence" in the essential fairness of the trial.

Maestas, 2012 UT at ,I 363.
But any errors, alleged or acknowledged, even if taken together, did
not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial. The State presented ample
evidence to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Section
IV. Even if the trial was not perfect, it was fair. That is all the Constitution
requires.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (" As we have

stressed on more than one occasion, the Constitution entitles a criminal
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."); State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 348
(Utah 1980) (Stewart,

J.,

concurring) ("Like all human endeavors, trials are

rarely if ever conducted without at least some arguable error.").
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted May 19, 2016.
SIM GILL

Salt Lake District Attorney

PITTEL

Deputy District Attorney
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

1

disagree with the law as I state it.
Do any of you feel you would have trouble doing that?

2
3

If so, please raise your number.

4
5

I'm going to ask if anybody here has ever been
involved in a serious car accident.

Let's go by rows.

Anybody on the second row?

6

7

No numbers are raised.

Anybody -- number

22, 20.

What's your number?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Five.

9

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

I have a question.

THE COURT:

11

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

All right.
Do you mean me personally or

12

somebody really close to you?

13

THE COURT:

14

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Then no.

15

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Twenty-eight.

16

THE COURT:

17

Let's stick with you personally.

Twenty-five had his up.

Twenty-six,

28,

31.

18

Okay.

19

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

20

THE COURT:

21

8.

Number 13, No. 17.

8

10

No.

We will come back to that later.
One more.

Twenty-one.

Sorry.

31 I have already.

All

right.

22

If you are chosen as a juror, you must base your

23

verdict solely on the evidence provided by the witness who

24

testify in this case and on any documents or other physical

25

evidence received.
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Do any of you feel that you would have trouble doing

1

2

that?

If so, please raise your number.

In other words, you

3

don't get to go to [inaudible] on research.

No numbers raised.

As jurors, you must have an open mind free from any

4

5

prejudices related to the case or the parties.

6

have any questions in your mind about your ability to return a

7

verdict of guilty or not guilty based solely on the evidence

8

presented, in other words free from outside influences or

9

biases, please raise your number.

Okay.

If any of you

This is you can't

10

take your personal stuff.

You have to choose

11

case based just on the evidence you hear, not on what's

12

happened in your own lives.

13

that?

No numbers raised.

or decide this

Does anyone have a problem with
No numbers raised.

Do any of you have difficulty sitting in judgment,

14
15

whether it's for anxiety, religious, moral, whatever reasons?

16

If so, please raise your numbers.

17

else?

No ..

[inaudible]

Anybody

I've got 19.
Twenty-nine.

18

MR. SORENSON:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SORENSON:

21

THE COURT:

22

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

23

THE COURT:

And 22.

24

All right.

Let's see.

25

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

What?
Twenty-nine is [inaudible)

Twenty-nine.
Actually one more.

Can I have counsel approach?

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549
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THE COURT:

1

2

out and we talk about who we want to talk to one on one?
MR. SORENSON:

3

4

Any other questions before I send them

Could you ask if anyone close to you

has been involved in a serious car accident?

5

THE COURT:

So you want that too?

6

going to be everybody.

7

Why talk to all these people when

You know that's

Everybody has been in a car accident.

8

MR. LEAVITT:

I would suggest as far as the people

9

who have been in a car accident,

I think that everyone

10

generally could just ask would that experience affect your

11

ability to be fair and impartial.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. LEAVITT:

14

THE COURT:

Then we'll only bring back the ones who

feel like it would affect them.

17
18

And that may save the time to bring

everyone back.

15

16

Okay.

MR. SORENSON:

And I would like to talk to everybody,

but --

19

THE COURT:

20

Then we are going to expand that to anybody close to

21

Front row.

23

Second row?

25

Okay.

you who has been involved in a serious car accident.

22

24

I'm sure you would.

Anybody else?

No. 1 and No. 10 and No. 9 and No. 6.
Thirteen.

We've already got.

I can't see your number.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Fifteen.

Eighteen.

Eighteen.

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801} 634-5549
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THE COURT:

1
2

Twenty-three, 24 and 26 I've

got already.

3
4

Third row?

Let's see anybody on that back row?

Thirty-two.

Yeah, I've already got 31.

5

All right.

Those of you that have been or know

6

somebody close to you that has been in a car accident, is there

7

anything about that experience that makes you feel like you

8

might be biased for one side or the other?
No. 1 first.

9
10

okay, 13.

11

row?

Anyone else on the front row?

On the second row 17.

12

Third row?

13

Back row?

14

All right.

No. 2

Anybody else on the second

Twenty-six.

What we're going to do now is speak to

15

you one on one about some of the questions that I left hanging.

16

So we're going to ask you to follow the bailiff and do what he

17

says, and we will start with No. 1.

THE BAILIFF:

18
19

All right.

We're going to be exiting

except for No. 1.

20

THE COURT:

21

Could I have counsel come up here while everybody is

22

Follow him.

leaving?

23

(Discussion held at sidebar.)

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SORENSON:

Okay.

We have [inaudible]

And Defense has no objection to
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1

striking her.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LEAVITT:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LEAVITT:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SORENSON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LEAVITT:

I note she has problems

~

She's been sitting in judgment.

-- childcare.
That's fine.
Issues [inaudible] sitting in judgment.

Do you have a problem?
No, it's fine.

10

MR. SORENSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

So that's 19 and 22

[inaudible]

MR. SORENSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SORENSON:

16

MR. LEAVITT:

Did 29 say they can't judge?

They have difficulty sitting in judgment.
And Defense would move to strike 29.
Let's wait and see if we can get there.

They may not be in the play.

THE COURT:

18
19

She has nine kids.

[inaudible] okay.

13

17

No objection to striking her.

[inaudible] find somebody guilty.

If

he's going to strike.

20

MR. LEAVITT:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LEAVITT:

23

THE COURT:

Actually that's fine.

That's fine.

[inaudible]
That's okay.
The reason being is I've had people

24

[inaudible] before deliberations have even started for one of

25

them.
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MR. SORENSON:

1

And Defense would also move to strike

2

No. 11.

She's the one that has to take care of her 90 year old

3

mother.

I think she said on Wednesdays.
THE COURT:

4
5

Tuesdays and Thursdays.

MR. LEAVITT:

Let's wait on that one to make sure we

have enough.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LEAVITT:

Okay.
And if we're fine,

10

problem with that.

11

because that's we [inaudible] first day so.
THE COURT:

13

MR. SORENSON:

14

THE COURT:

[inaudible]

Just so I know, are we going

We're going to start to bring them in one

MR. LEAVITT:

Right.

We're going to bring back the

people as far as -- a million car accidents as far as bias
THE COURT:

18
19

All right.

at a time.

16

17

I don't have a

I just don't want to run out of jurors

12

15

So

she's probably got somebody else there now.

6
7

Thursdays.

I don't think that's going to be a

problem.
MR. SORENSON:

20

And is the record on?

Just for the

21

benefit of the record,

I would like to talk with every single

22

person who raised their hand.

23

serious car accident or a close friend was involved in a

24

serious car accident just to know the circumstances, what

25

happened.

Either they were involved in a
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THE COURT:

1

Isn't it that case asking cars

2

[inaudible] every single person is going to go yes.

3

you going to talk to every single one of them?

4

when they've -- when they've said it's going to cause a problem

5

for them?

6

And are

They

not

[inaudible]
My position is that your question of

MR. LEAVITT:

7

would it create a bias, you can overcome, we rehabilitate

8

everybody except for those [inaudible] I think they've been

9

rehabilitated.

10
11
12

13
14

MR. SORENSON:

And I don't -- I would like to talk to

them, but I understand the Court's ruling.
THE COURT:

We'll start with No. 1, who's had the

benefit of listening to some of the things that lawyers do.
You mentioned that you have been involved in a

15

serious car accident or someone close to you and you worried it

16

could cause bias.

17

Could you tell us about that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Well, I work in a life insurance

18

business, so I have several clients and I train financial

19

planners who sell the products.

20

in our industry of people who have lost ones in car accidents.

21

And we try to do our best to protect those individuals who, you

22

know, lose a loved one.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

So we have a lot of stories of

Well, then you know sometimes when

24

car accidents happen, there is fault and it can go in all

25

directions; isn't that correct?
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1

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

2

THE COURT:

Yes.

He's nodding yes.

So having not heard

3

the facts of this case, do you think you could make a decision

4

involving this case based only on the facts you hear, not on

5

other accidents that you've heard about?

6

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

7

THE COURT:

8

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

9

THE COURT:

Are you confident that you could or not?

Okay.

10

MR. LEAVITT:

11

MR. SORENSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

Okay.

14

MR. SORENSON:

15

I'm not confident.

Any questions from counsel?

No.
No.
Thank you.

Any motions as to No. l?
The Defense would move to strike at

this time.

MR. LEAVITT:

17

THE COURT:

18

No. 13.

19

MR. LEAVITT:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. LEAVITT:

22

him where he's from,

23

THE COURT:

25

Um,

All right.

16

24

I would like to be able to.

No objection.
No. 1 is out for cause.

I might know No. 6.
Oh.

Bring No. 6 in.

So could we bring him .in?

I could ask

if it's the same guy.
Just grab an end seat there.

Where are

you from?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Herriman.

Well,

I live in
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1

Herriman.

2
3

I'm from Box Elder County actually.
Okay.

THE COURT:

know you.

One of our counsel thinks they may

Any questions from counsel?

4

MR. LEAVITT:

5

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

6

MR. LEAVITT:

7

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

8

THE COURT:

9

had a car accident.

10

Casey Roche is your brother?
Casey is my younger brother,

yes.

Casey [inaudible]

Okay.

Yeah, I know Casey well.
That takes care.

Oh, well, you

Tell us about that.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Well, which one?

11

Mindy, was in a car wreck that totaled her car.

12

really.

13

THE COURT:

14

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

My spouse,
No injuries

That's good.
Biggest pet peeve in the world.

15

Really somebody stopped in traffic and she went over one, two

16

lanes onto oncoming traffic.
THE COURT:

17
18

That's a no, no.

So it was her

It was her fault.

And she didn't

fault?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

19

20

Oh, no.

think it was.

And I had to explain, yeah, it's your fault.

21

THE COURT:

22

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Oh, okay.
And then my mom was in a car

23

wrecked her Jeep in Ogden,

just rear ended at a stop sign.

24

Somebody just behind her didn't slow down and totaled her Jeep,

25

but ...
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THE COURT:

1

Are there anything about those accidents

2

that you think might make you feel biased one way or another in

3

this case?

4

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

5

THE COURT:

6

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

7

THE COURT:

9

MR. LEAVITT:

Okay.

Okay.

They're -- unfortunately they're

Any other questions from counsel?

No.

10

MR. SORENSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

13

MR. SORENSON:

No.

All right.

Thank you.

You bet.

Defense would move to strike based on
<tJ

the familiarity.

15

MR. LEAVITT:

16

THE COURT:

17

Now 13.

18

Any seat is fine.

That's fine.
Six for cause.

All right.

So you mentioned having been

19

involved in a car crash or someone close to you.

20

us about that?

21
22
23

I mean --

unavoidable but, you know.

8

14

Accidents happen.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Can you tell

About five or six years ago my

mother-in-law was killed by a drunk driver.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything about that case that you

24

feel would make you biased in this one, or could you judge this

25

by the facts that you hear just in this case?
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1
2

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

the evidence.

3

4

I think I could judge it based on

THE COURT:

And you would be able to put your

personal experiences aside?

5

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SORENSON:

I would do my best.

Any questions from counsel?
If I may.

It sounds like you'd do

8

your best, but do you honestly think -- I mean, it sounds like

9

a tragic experience.

10

trial?

11

confident about it?

Do you think you could give him a fair

And I understand you'd do your best, but are you

12

PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

13

MR. SORENSON:

14

MR. LEAVITT:

15

THE COURT:

16

No. 17 would be next.

17

I think so, yes.

Okay.
Okay.

Thanks.

All right.

Thank you.
We don't have any motions, do

we?

18

THE BAILIFF:

19

THE COURT:

Seventeen.

20

All right.

You mentioned you or someone close to you

21
22

17?

being involved in a serious car accident.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR:

Tell us about that.

It's 32 years ago.

I was turning

23

left and someone hit me as they went through a red light.

24

I was due to deliver our baby the next week, so I was nine

25

months pregnant and the baby died.

And

And I was in serious
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Addendum B

JURY INSTRUCTION NO._~
A person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct, or to
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.

A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

A person engages in conduct recklessly with respect to the circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that is disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circwnstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.

A person acts with criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.

"Conduct" means either an act or an omission.
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JURY ThTSTRUCTION NO~
If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable mental
state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally
knowingly or recklessly.
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JURY INSTRUCTION ):_f:::,
To establish criminal negligence, it is necessary to show conduct which is a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standard. It is therefore a subjective element requiring
consideration of all relevant circumstances surrounding the incident. Negligent homicide
involves the defendant's perception of risk and necessarily requires an evaluation of his or her
state of mind.

00213
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

J, 1

Conduct is not criminally negligent unless it constitutes a "gross deviation" from the
standard of care exercised by an ordinary person. Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for a
civil action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. Mere inattention or
mistake in judgment resulting even in death of another is not criminal unless the quality of the
act makes it so. Criminal negligence must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution;

it must be something more than mere inadvertence or misadventure.

00214
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JURY INSTRUCTION 3.__b

The substantial and unjustifiable "risk of which a person ought to be aware in a case of
negligent homicide is death.·

@

00223
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AddendumC

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AddendumC

0

Cited

As of: May 19, 2016 11 :37 AM EDT

State v. Boss
Court of Appeals of Utah
December 8, 2005, Filed
Case No. 20040714-CA
Reporter
2005 UT App 520; 127 P.3d 1236; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 536; 540 Utah Adv. Rep. 15

State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
Boss, Defendant and Appellant.

v. Dorothy Nanette

r....

Prior History:
11 Fourth District, Provo Department,
031404560. The Honorable Samuel McVey.

created a condition of peril, which led to a substantial
risk of death, and therefore, a jury could have properly
found her conduct to be the proximate cause of the
resulting collision.
Outcome
The judgment was affirmed.

Core Terms
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LexisNexis® Headnotes
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review >
Substantial Evidence > General Overview
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Inferences
Evidence > Burdens of Proof> Proof Beyond Reasonable
Doubt

Case Summary
Procedural Posture
The Fourth District, Provo Department (Utah) convicted
defendant of negligent homicide, a class A
misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-206 (2003).

Overview
Defendant caused an automobile collision in which a
child was killed. At issue on appeal was whether there
was sufficient evidence to support defendant's
conviction of negligent homicide with regard to the
elements of: (1) criminal negligence; and, (2) causation.
Her attempt to pass two or more cars on a two-lane
highway, in the face of oncoming traffic, at a speed of70
miles per hour--followed by a sharp, over-correcting
lane transition causing loss of vehicle control--created a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. Her actions
were repeated deviations from the appropriate standard
of care, each of which might have resulted in a
substantial and unjustifiable chance of death. Her
conduct was indicative of criminal negligence as
opposed to mere inattention or a mistake in judgment.
Second, she argued that the State did not establish that
her conduct caused the death of the child. Her conduct

HN1 In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims,
appellate courts reverse a jury verdict only when the
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt. They examine the
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. So long
as there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, their
inquiry stops.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Homicide, Manslaughter
& Murder> Involuntary Manslaughter> General Overview
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States >
Mens Rea > Negligence

HN2 Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1 J (2003),
criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death
of another.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States >
Mens Rea > Negligence
Torts > ... > Duty > Standards of Care > General Overview
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HN3 Under Utah law, a person acts with criminal
negligence when she ought to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103{4) (2003).
The substantial and unjustifiable risk of which a person
ought to be aware in a case of negligent homicide is
death. According to the Utah Code, the risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103(4}.
Criminal Law & Procedure> ... > Acts & Mental States>
Mens Rea > Negligence

HN4 Notably, ordinary negligence is not sufficient to
constitute criminal negligence. Mere inattention or
mistake in judgment resulting even in death of another
is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States >
Mens Rea > Negligence
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States >
Mens Rea > Recklessness
Torts > Negligence > General Overview

HN5 Criminal negligence, like recklessness, and unlike
ordinary negligence, requires a gross deviation from
the applicable standard of care. The risk of death
required for recklessness and for criminally negligent
conduct is the same; the only difference between the
two is whether the defendant was aware of that risk.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States >
Mens Rea > Negligence

HN6 Criminal negligence requires a causal connection
between defendant's actions and the ultimate result.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Acts & Mental States >
Mens Rea > Negligence
Torts > ... > Causation > Proximate Cause > General
Overview

HN7 Where a party by his wrongful conduct creates a
condition of peril, his action can properly be found to be
the proximate cause of a resulting injury, even though
later events that combined to cause the injury may also
be classified as negligent, so long as the latter act is
something which can reasonably be expected to follow
in the natural sequence of events.

Counsel: Shelden R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant.
Tim Taylor, Provo, for Appellee.

Judges: Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge. WE
CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh,
Judge.
Opinion by: Judith M. Billings

Opinion
[*"'1237] BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:

rP1] Defendant Dorothy Nanette Boss appeals from a
jury conviction of negligent homicide, a class A
misdemeanor, under Utah Code section 76-5-206. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (2003). On appeal,
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to
support a conviction of negligent homicide, because
Defendant's conduct (1) did not rise to the level of
criminal negligence and (2) was not the proximate cause
of the collision. We affirm Defendant's conviction.
BACKGROUND

rP2] On September 17, 2003, Defendant was driving
westbound on Highway 73, a two-lane highway, near
Saratoga Springs, Utah. Wendell Roy Hathaway
(Hathaway) was driving eastbound on Highway 73 with
his family when he saw Defendant pull out of the
westbound lane of traffic into the [*"""2] eastbound lane
in an attempt to pass two or more cars. Noting
Defendant's approach in the eastbound lane, Hathaway
slowed down and began to pull off onto the south side of
the road. Hathaway then saw Defendant's car cut
sharply back into the westbound lane directly behind a
westbound dump truck and, within seconds, return into
the eastbound lane, sliding sideways on the driver's
side of the car. Defendant's car hit the Hathaway car,
which at the time of impact was at the far side of the
eastbound lane. Jaycee Hathaway, Hathaway's
four-year-old daughter, was sitting in a car seat on the
back driver's side when the impact occurred. She
suffered severe head trauma and died later that day
from her injuries. Besides Hathaway and his family,
there were no other witnesses to the accident.
(*P3]
Deputy Ray Edwards (Officer Edwards)
investigated the scene of the accident. Initially, no one
informed Officer Edwards that Defendant's vehicle
emerged from the westbound lane on its side before
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hitting Hathaway's car. As a result, Officer Edwards did
not collect any physical evidence indicating what caused
Defendant's car to enter the eastbound lane on its side.
At trial, Officer Edwards testified r-31 that aggressive
steering combined with speed could lift a car sideways
onto two wheels. Officer Edwards also stated that a
particular driveway, located on the west shoulder of
Highway 73, could have acted as a ramp, lifting
Defendant's car onto two wheels if Defendant had hit it.
[*P4] Deputy Susan Morgan (Officer Morgan), the
officer who first responded to the accident, testified that
Defendant said she was traveling at seventy miles per
hour at the time of the accident. The speed limit in the
area was sixty-five miles per hour.
[*PS] Gregory Du Val {Du Val), an expert witness hired
by the State to reconstruct the accident, testified that in
order for Defendant's car to roll onto the driver's side
and slide into the eastbound lane, it must have left the
paved roadway and hit a ramp or some other lifting
mechanism. Du Val stated that this mechanism was
likely the driveway identified by Officer Edwards. Du Val
further testified that to reach the driveway, Defendant
would have had to steer aggressively with a force
beyond what would normally have been needed to
return her car to c-1238] the westbound lane of traffic.
Du Val opined that the use of such force was negligent.
rPs] r**4] Dennis Andrews (Andrews), another expert
witness in accident reconstruction for the State, testified
that he was unable to identify what caused Defendant's
car to roll on its side and that no preimpact speeds could
be calculated. Andrews also testified that, although he
could not speculate as to whether Defendant's specific
actions, causing her car to move back into the
eastbound lane, were negligent. her overall actions
were negligent.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
rP9] At issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient
evidence to support Defendant's conviction of negligent
homicide with r-s1 regard to the elements of (1)
criminal negligence and (2) causation. HN1 In reviewing
sufficiency of the evidence claims, we reverse a jury
verdict only when the evidence "is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt."
State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58, P65. 27 P.3d 1115
(quotations and citations omitted). We examine the
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. See
State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22. P18. 70 P.3d 111. "So
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our
inquiry stops." Mead. 2001 UT 58 at P67 (quotations
and citation omitted).

ANALYSIS
[*P1 O]
Defendant argues there was insufficient
evidence to support her conviction of negligent
homicide, under Utah Code section 76-5-206(1 L where
Defendant's conduct (1) did not rise to the level of
criminal negligence and (2) was not the proximate cause
of the collision. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1 J.
HN2 Under section 76-5-206(1 ), "criminal homicide
constitutes negligent homicide [*"*6] if the actor, acting
with criminal negligence, causes the death of another."
Id.

I. Criminal Negligence
[*P11] First, Defendant argues that her actions did not

a vehicle may not be operated on the left side of the
center of the roadway in overtaking and passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
unless the left side is clearly visible and is free of
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance to permit
overtaking and passing to be completed without
interfering with the operation of any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction of any
vehicle overtaken.

amount to criminal negligence. HN3 Under Utah law, a
person acts with criminal negligence when "she ought
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (2003). The substantial and
unjustifiable risk of which a person ought to be aware in
a case of negligent homicide is death. See State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254. 267 /Utah 1988). According
to the Utah Code, "the risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-103(4).

[*PS] The jury found Defendant guilty of negligent
homicide. Defendant appeals.

[*P12] HN4 Notably, "ordinary negligence ... is not
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." State v.

[*P7] At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge
instructed the jury that
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Larsen. 2000 UT App 106. P18. 999 P.2d 1252
(quotations and citation omitted). 111 Mere inattention or
mistake in r-"7] judgment resulting even in death of
another is not criminal unless the quality of the act
makes it so."' Id. (quoting State v. Warden. 784 P.2d
1204. 1207 /Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
rP13] Defendant contends the case of State

v. Larsen

is factually similar to our case here. See 999 P. 2d 1252.
2000 UT App 106. In that case, the defendant made a
left turn at normal speed at an intersection and collided
with an oncoming car, which would have been visible to
the defendant had he been looking. See id. at P19. In
Larsen, the oncoming car clearly had the right of way,
[*"'1239] and the defendant had a small amount of
alcohol in his system. See id. One of the passengers in
the oncoming car was killed as a result of the collision,
and the defendant was convicted of negligent homicide.
See id. at PP7-8. The defendant challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See id. at P15.
On appeal, we held that while the defendant's conduct
was negligent, it was not a gross deviation from the
standard of care. See id. at P24.
[*P14] Defendant, citing language from Larsen, argues
that her conduct was not criminally negligent because it
did not [***8] amount to recklessness or an indifference
incompatible with a proper regard for human life. 1
However, we agree with the State that the "reckless"
and "indifferent" language we employed in Larsen is
unfortunate and should not be read to substitute
1

recklessness for the relevant standard set forth in section 76-2-103/4). 2
[*P15]
[***9]
Defendant maintains that like the
defendant's conduct in Larsen, her actions were not
criminally negligent, but rather represented a serious
mistake in judgment. However, unlike the evidence in
Larsen, here there was testimony revealing Defendant's
excessive speed and aggressive steering when she
attempted to return her car to the right side of the road
after passing. We simply cannot conclude that no
reasonable juror could find that Defendant's attempt to
pass two or more cars on a two-lane highway, in the
face of oncoming traffic, at a speed of seventy miles per
hour-followed by a sharp, overcorrecting lane transition
causing loss of vehicle control--created a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of death.
[*P16] Although there are no Utah negligent homicide
cases factually on point with the present case, the
analytical framework of Utah negligent homicide cases
supports our decision to affirm the jury's verdict in the
instant case. In State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah
1991). the Utah Supreme Court reversed a decision by
the court of appeals and upheld a doctor's jury conviction
for negligent homicide of a newborn where the doctor
failed [***10) to monitor the condition of the premature
newborn, despite knowing the baby suffered from a
respiratory condition; inform the newborn's parents of
the gravity of the baby's condition; and hospitalize the
baby. See id. at 1151-52. The court stated, "There was
evidence of repeated deviations from the standard of

In State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106. 999 P.2d 1252, we stated:
The facts presented at trial do not indicate that defendant's actions were undertaken recklessly or with an
indifference to human life, nor does the quality of defendant's act lead to the conclusion that his actions were
criminal. Rather, defendant simply failed to see an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he made a
left turn, with tragic consequences.
Id. at P21.

2

Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (2003) (stating persons act recklessly when they are "aware of but consciously
disregard[] a substantial and unjustifiable risk" (emphasis added)), with id. § 76-2-103( 4) (stating that persons act with criminal
negligence when they "ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur" (emphasis added)). HN5 Criminal negligence, like recklessness, and unlike ordinary negligence, requires a gross
deviation from the applicable standard of care. See State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254. 267 (Utah 1988} (comparing and
contrasting reckless manslaughter with negligent homicide). The risk of death required for recklessness and for criminally
negligent conduct is the same; the only difference between the two is whether the defendant was aware of that risk. See id.; see
also State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201. 206 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (describing the distinction between reckless manslaughter and
negligent homicide as whether person perceives risk of death, not degree of perception of risk). Therefore, despite the Larsen
court's reference to recklessness, our decision in that case was correct, because it hinged upon the court's determination that
the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from
the standard of care. See Larsen. 2000 UT App 106 at P27.
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care, a wide divergence between the appropriate level
of care and the care actually received, [and] a significant
chance of death .... " Id. at 1152 (emphasis added).
rP17]

Here, like the doctor's separate actions in

Warden, Defendant's speeding, passing a line of

vehicles in the face of oncoming traffic, and making a
sharp, overcorrecting lane transition, may be seen as
repeated deviations from the appropriate standard of
care, each of which might result in a substantial [*1240]
and unjustifiable chance of death under the
circumstances.
[*P18] Also, in State v. Hallett. 619 P.2d 335 (Utah
1980), the defendant was convicted of negligent

homicide when he took a stop sign down, which later
caused a car to collide with another car at an
intersection. See id. at 337. The defendant appealed
r**11] based, in part, upon a sufficiency of the evidence
claim. See id. at 338. The Utah Supreme Court upheld
the lower court's conviction where the evidence
established the defendant
could not fail to know that stop signs are placed at
particular intersections where they are deemed to
be necessary because of special hazards; and that
without the stop sign, the hazards which caused it
to be placed there would exist; and that he should
have foreseen that its removal would result in setting
a trap fraught with danger and possible fatal
consequences to others.

Id.
[*P19] In this case, Defendant's violation of traffic rules
was tantamount to the actions of the defendant in the
Hallet case, both in terms of the risks created and that
the hazards of violating multiple traffic rules ought to
have been known. Defendant's conduct is ultimately
indicative of criminal negligence as opposed to mere
inattention or a mistake in judgment.
[*P20] Additionally, there is persuasive authority from
other jurisdictions, with statutory standards similar to
ours, that support the proposition that improper attempts
to pass, combined with speed, can meet the [***12]
substantial and unjustifiable risk or gross deviation
standard. In State v. Wall. 481 N.W2d 259 (S.D. 1992).
the defendant was convicted of involuntary or reckless
manslaughter when, while driving at a high speed,
ducking in and out of lanes, and attempting to pass
multiple cars in one lengthy pass, she ran into a pickup.
See id. at 261-62. The defendant appealed based on

insufficiency of the evidence, and the South Dakota
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision. See
id. at 263. Similarly, in State v. Wilcoxon. 639 So. 2d 385
{La. Ct. App. 1994). the defendant was convicted of
negligent homicide when, driving over seventy miles
per hour, defendant attempted a pass uphill and around
a curve marked as a no-passing zone and, despite
applying his brakes, collided with an oncoming car. See
id. at 387. The defendant appealed based on
insufficiency of the evidence, but the court of appeals
upheld the lower court's conviction. See id. at 389.
[*P21] In summary, Defendant has failed to persuade
this court that the evidence in the instant case was so
inconclusive that reasonable [***13] minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that Defendant was
guilty of negligent homicide.

II. Causation
[*P22] Second, Defendant argues that the State did not
establish that her conduct caused the death of the child.
Specifically, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence regarding the particular mechanism that
caused Defendant's car to lift, roll onto its side, cross
the lane, and collide with the Hathaway car. HN6
Criminal negligence "requires a causal connection
between defendant's actions and the ultimate result."

State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106. P20. 999 P.2d 1252.
[*P23] In State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 {Utah 1980), the

Utah Supreme Court found the defendant's removal of
a stop sign to be a gross deviation from the standard of
care, which created a
substantial and unjustifiable risk. The defendant in
Hallet claimed that he was not the proximate cause

of the resulting death because there was evidence
that one of the vehicles, which subsequently collided
at the intersection, was speeding. See id. at 338. In
response to the defendant's contention, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that
HN7 where [***14] a party by his wrongful
conduct creates a condition of peril, his action
can properly be found to be the proximate
cause of a resulting injury, even though later
events [that] combined to cause the injury may
also be classified as negligent, so long as the
latter act is something which can reasonably be
expected to follow in the natural sequence of
events.
Id. at 339.
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[*P24] In this case, there was testimony at trial that a
specific driveway, adjacent to the [**1241] road where
the accident occurred, was the mechanism that,
combined with Defendant's conduct, likely caused the
fatal collision. Both Officer Edwards and expert witness
Du Val, an accident reconstructionist, identified the
driveway on the shoulder of the road as the probable
lifting mechanism that contributed to Defendant's car
reentering the eastbound lane on its side.
[*P25] However, the jury could reasonably conclude it
was Defendant's conduct that caused her to lose control
of her vehicle, and ultimately crash into the oncoming
vehicle. Defendant attempted to pass two or more cars
on a two-lane highway, in the face of oncoming traffic, at
a speed of seventy miles per hour, subsequently c--1s1
making a sharp, overcorrecting lane transition, which
likely caused her car to hit the driveway. Like the
defendant's conduct in Hallett, Defendant's conduct
created a condition of peril, which led to a substantial
risk of death, and therefore, a jury could have properly
found Defendant's conduct to be the proximate cause of
the resulting collision. Thus, we cannot say the evidence

that Defendant's conduct caused the collision was so
"inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. State
v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, P65. 27 P.3d 1115 (quotations
and citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
[*P26] We conclude that the evidence presented to the
jury was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of
negligent homicide. we therefore affirm Defendant's
conviction.

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge
(*P27] WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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76-5-207 Automobile homicide.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Drug" or "drugs" means:
{i) a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;
{ii) a drug as defined in Section 58-1?b-102; or
{iii) any substance that, when knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly taken into the human body,
can impair the ability of a person to safely operate a motor vehicle.
(b) "Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van,
motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(2)
{a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person operates a
motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and:
{i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
{ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
{iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation.
{b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is subsequent
to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501 (2).
{c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise
that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar
circumstances.
(3)
{a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person operates a
motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and:
{i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
{ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
{iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation.
{b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as defined by
Subsection 76-2-103( 4 ).
{4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 apply
to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section.
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in
accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(1 ).
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug is not a defense.
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except
when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(8) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering bodily injury or serious bodily
injury as a result of the person's violation of Section 41-6a-502 or death as a result of the
person's violation of this section whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of
driving.
Amended by Chapter 214, 2009 General Session
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